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I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand, as a sovereign State, has both the right and the duty to control 
its borders. One of the most effective ways of exercising this control is to detain 
those who the State does not want to enter. This not only prevents that unwanted 
person from entering the community, but also deters other undesirables from 
trying to do so. 
However, New Zealand has voluntarily limited this right to control its border 
by acceding to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol (the Convention1), which require that certain rights be afforded to 
refugee status claimants that other illegal aliens do not enjoy. This special 
treatment is in recognition of the difficult circumstances refugees face. In 
particular, it is often difficult for them to obtain valid travel and entry documents 
for the country where they wish to seek asylum. "' Article 31 of the Convention 
stipulates that refugees should only be detained where necessary; the mere fact 
that they do not have valid documents is, of itself, not enough to warrant 
detention. > 
Events of the past year highlight the conflicts that can arise between these 
different interests, anckthe impact this has on the way refugees are dealt with. On 
the one hand the terrorist attacks of September 11 , and the concerns about people 
smuggling which were raised by the Tampa affair, focussed attention on the 
importance of national security. On the other, the widespread condemnation of 
the actions of the Australian Government in relation not only to the Tampa 
refugees, but also to refugees generally , reinforced the need for acceptable 
standards of treatment of refugees internationally. 
As the New Zealand Representative, Sarah Paterson, said to the United 
Nations General Assembly 
2 
The recent Tampa incident in the West Pacific brought home sharply to New Zealand and 
other countries in our region that even geographic isolation does not make us immune to the 
I 
problems of people smugglers and illegal migration. The activities of these criminals has 
pushed the issues of irregular and illegal migration to new levels of exploitation, conflict and, 
often, human tragedy . And they are putting the international refugee protection framework 
under increasing stress. 2
 
Thus the State needs to accommodate the rights of refugee status claimants 
under the Convention, with the right of the Crown to defend its borders. The 
question is whether New Zealand has found the appropriate balance. 
In New Zealand, the statutory authority for the detention of illegal immigrants 
1s found in section 128(5) of the Immigration Act 1987. Two recent 
developments have modified the position as to detention of refugee status 
claimants under this section. The first is the judgment of Baragwanath J in 
Refugee Council of New Zealand and the Human Rights Foundation Aotearoa 
New Zealand and D v Attorney General,3 in which he interpreted section 128(5), 
and in particular whether it can apply to refugee status claimants. The second is 
the Immigration Amendment Act 2002, which inserted a new section 128AA 
providing for conditional release of those detained under section 128(5}. In this 
paper I will discuss both of these developments in light of New Zealand ' s 
international obligations. Have we achieved the correct balance between national 
security and liberty of the person? Are we any closer to it? 
II IMMIGRATION ACT 1987 (PRIOR TO 2002 AMENDMENTS) 
The principal Act in New Zealand dealing with refugees and providing for 
their detention on arrival in this country is the Immigration Act 1987. An analysis 
1 For ease of reference this term will be used to describe both the Convention and the Protocol combined. 
2 Sarah Paterson, New Zealand Representative to the United Nations, Third Committee: Item 114: Report 
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Questions relating to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons 
and Humanitarian Questions (19 November 2001) <http ://www.un int/newzealand/humanrt. htm> (last 
accessed 28 June 2002). 
3 (27 June 2002) High Court Auckland M 1881-ASO 1. 
3 
of this Act and the way it has been interpreted, is necessary in order to determine 
whether the right balance has been struck. 
l The Immigration Act 1987 was amended in 1999 to deal specifically with 
refugee status claimants. From the debates in Parliament it is evident that in 
passmg the Immigration Amendment Act 1999 (No 1), Parliament sought to 
improve the balance between refugees' rights, and the need to control our borders. 
It was aimed at "ensuring that people who are an immigration risk are identified 
and removed from New Zealand at the earliest possible stage, while still allowing 
people with genuine humanitarian needs to have them met."4 Prior to the 
introduction of the Amendment Act, the Courts had often expressed the need for 
legislation to deal with refugee status claimants in line with our international 
obligations.5 The new Part VIA was inserted into the principal Act to meet this 
concern. ) 
Outside of Part VIA, certain prov1s1ons m the Act apply to illegal aliens 
generally, and set out what measures can be taken against those in New Zealand 
illegally. 
Section 4(1) of the Immigration Act 1987 allows persons other than New 
Zealand citizens to be in New Zealand only if they hold a permit granted under 
the Act, or are exempt from holding such a permit. Any person in contravention .. ~r --
of section 4(1) is deemed to be in New Zealand unlawfully. 
Section 128 relates to the detention an~departure of persons refused permits. 
~ j ~ ;, 
Subsection (5) allows for detention peµ-'ding that person ' s departure from New 
Zealand on the first available craft. This has been used to detain refugee claimants 
and other illegal aliens alike.6 
4 Hon TJ Delamere, MP (29 September 1998) NZPD 12789. 
5 See in particular Butler v Attorney General [1999]NZAR 205 (CA). 
6 The question of whether it should have been used for refugees is discussed in Section IV of this paper -
The Refugee Council case. 
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If such persons are to be detained for more than 48 hours from the time of 
their detention, then section 128(7) stipulates that an immigration officer or 
member of the Police must apply to a Registrar for a warrant of commitment. 
This warrant authorises detention for a period of up to 28 days, which can be 
extended, or further extended, under section 128(13) by a District Court Judge. 
The Judge may extend the warrant for a further period of 7 days, or, in the case of 
mass arrivals, for such period as he or she thinks fit. 
According to subsection 15, there is no power to grant bail to people detained 
under section 128. However, where review proceedings are brought by a person 
detained under section 128, section 128A allows a District Court Judge to then 
order the release of the person on bail if certain conditions are met,7 or to extend 
the warrant of commitment for a further 7 days.
8 
Section l28B deals with detention of persons whose eligibility for a permit is 
-:I ,! 
not immediately ascertainable. It is relevant to the present discussion in that it 
applies to people who arrive without appropriate documentation for immigration 
purposes, or with documents which appear to be false. Asylum seekers are often 
in this situation due to the special circumstances of their persecution or flight 
from their country of nationality.
9 
Subsection 3 states that any person to whom section l28B applies may be 
detained by the Police and placed in cuiody while a determination is made as to 
I 'f/ ./ 
7 Sees 128A(4) Immigration Act: 
(a) The review proceeding have not been completed at the time the person is brought before the 
Judge; and 
(b) The Judge is satisfied that the review proceedings are not likely to be completed within the next 7 
days; and 
(c) The person detained under the warrant satisfies the Judge that he or she is not likely to abscond, or 
to breach any condition imposed under subsection (6) of this section . 
8 Immigration Act 1987, sl28A(3). 
9 See UNHCR Standing Committee Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the 
Problem and the Recommended Practice ( 4 June 1999) para 7. 
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whether section 7(1) of the Act applies. 10 No later than 48 hours after a person is 
taken into custody, a member of the police or an immigration officer must apply 
to a District Court Judge for a warrant of commitment for a period of 28 days. 1
1 If 
they are not released or given a permit before the 28 days expire, then section 
1288(10) provides that the person detained shall be brought before a District 
Court Judge to review that person's continued custody under the warrant. While 
the person remains in custody, they must be brought before a Judge at least every 
seven days in order to have that question considered. Under subsection 11 the 
Judge must extend the warrant if satisfied the person is still a person to whom the 
section applies. 
III INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
In order to determine whether the provisions of the Immigration Act do strike 
the correct balance between_ natio~ security and the rights of refugees to Jjbect}'. .. 
consideration must first be given to the nature of the rights refugees hav~ The 
principal source of these rights is the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951, which prescribes minimum rights to be afforded to refugees. 12 
10 Section 7(1) concerns persons who are not eligible for a permit. It includes people with certain criminal 
convictions; who have been deported, or who are the subject of a removal order; or about whom the 
Minister has reason to believe has terrorist or criminal motives or associations; and so on. 
11 Immigration Act 1987, s 128AB(6). 
/' 
12 This paper is primarily concerned with protection from detention under the Refugee Convention. 
However, it is important to note that besides the Convention, several other international documents give 
rise to obligations to refugee status claimants, and, arguably give broader protection, by including those 
outside the restrictive Convention definition of "refugee" . [See James C Hathaway The Law of Refugee 
Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 1991) 24-25 .] For example, Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights protects the right "to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution". This is 
not a right to receive asylum, only to seek and enjoy it. However, when asylum seekers are not given 
adequate opportunity to present their case, or if once accepted as a refugee, excessive restraints or 
unreasonable conditions of detention are imposed, this may violate article 14. [Richard Plender and Nuala 
Mole "Beyond the Geneva Convention: Constructing a de facto right of asylum from international human 
rights instruments" in Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: 
Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) 81 , 81-82.] 
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), more explicitly concerns 
detention. It states that 
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest 
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law." 
This gives an enforceable right to compensation where a person has been unlawfully arrested or detained. 
Domestically, there may also be remedies in the Bill of Rights Act 1990, particularly ss 21 and 22. 
6 
A The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
1 Introduction 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 28 July 1951, and came into force in April 1954. 
Essentially the Convention lays down minimum standards for the treatment of 
refugees. It consolidated previous international instruments relating to refugees 
and provides "the most comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees yet 
attempted on the international level". 13 
Initially, the Convention was limited in application to people who became 
refugees as a result of events before 1 January 1951. Refugees were considered a 
temporary problem resulting from World War II, which would in time go away. 
Thus the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 14 who is 
entrusted, inter alia, with promoting international instruments for protection of 
refugees and supervising their application, was originally given a projected life 
span of a mere three years. 15 
However, rather than going away, the problem grew. It became necessary to 
enact the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to remove the 
geographical and temporal limits from the 1951 Convention. Fifty-one years 
13 UNHCR, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 195 l , Introductory Note (Geneva, l 996). 
14 The UNHCR was established on the 14 December 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly, 
although there were High Commissioners for Refugees before this time. 
It is one of the world's principal humanitarian agencies and seeks to protect refugees and help them restart 
their lives in a normal environment. Am important part of the agency's work involves International 
protection, promoting human rights agreements and monitoring governmental compliance. 
Its efforts are mandated by statute and guided by the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
However it also works with groups, such as internally displaced peoples, which do not fit within the 
Convention definition of "refugee". 
The UNHCR policy and programmes are approved by the Executive Committee of 57 Member States 
which meets annually. The High Commissioner reports annually to the UN General Assembly . 
See <http ://www.UNHCR.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=basics > (last accessed 6August 2002). 
15 Parliamentary Library "Refugees- an Overview" (14 November 2001) Background Note 2001/12, 1. 
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after its creation, the UNHCR still has plenty to do, and the Refugee Convention 
it promotes is as relevant today as it was then. 16 
2 Definition of "refugee" 
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention defines the term "refugee". It 
applies to any person who 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country: or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it 
Claimants must (a) prove they are outside their country of ongm; (b) 
establish that they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of 
their country of origin; (c) establish that they are unable or unwilling to do so due 
to a well-founded fear of persecution; and (d) establish that the persecution is on 
the basis of criteria outlined in Article 1A(2) - race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 17 
The Convention definition of "refugee" is thus much narrower than the 
ordinary meaning of the word and does not include those fleeing natural disasters , 
internally displaced people or economic migrants for example. Regardless of 
genuine need for assistance, these people will not benefit from the rights under the 
Convention, as their situation is not due to a well founded fear of persecution, but 
to other circumstances. "Persecution" is not defined in the Convention itself but 
has been generally defined in New Zealand for the purposes of status 
determination as "the sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights 
16 For example, as recently as 4 April 2002, the Ukraine ratified the 1967 Protocol . As at 15 April 2002 
there were 140 State parties to the 195 l Convention, and 139 to the Protocol. l 44 States are party to one or 
both of the Convention and Protocol, and 135 States are party to both. 
See UNHCR<http://www.unhcr.ch> (last accessed 26 August 2002). 
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resulting from the failure of state protection" .18 However, any decision as to 
whether a fear of persecution is well-founded or not is necessarily "an essay in 
hypothesis" as it concerns what might happen to the applicant in the future if 
returned to the country of origin. 19 Nevertheless, any well founded fear will 
require examination of the class of persons affected, the interests in respect of 
which they stand to be punished, the likelihood of punishment, and the nature and 
extent of the penalties.20 If the persecution claimed is not for a Convention 
reason, or no longer exists at the time of the status determination, the claimant is 
not considered to be a refugee. 
There is also a number of exception prov1s10ns, which provide that the 
Convention shall not apply to people who would otherwise qualify as refugees 
under Article IA, but to whom Articles IC to IF of the Convention apply. This 
includes people who have ceased to require protection, receive protection from 
other United Nations Agencies, have been given rights similar to nationals in their 
country of refuge and those who have committed certain crimes making them 
unworthy for protection. The Convention definition is limited to those who need 
and deserve protection. 
The Convention definition has been adopted in New Zealand by section 129F 
of the Immigration Act. 
Within this limited definition, the Convention recogruses two types of 
refugees, quota refugees and spontaneous refugees. This paper deals only with 
17 For a comprehensive examination of these requirements see James C Hathaway The Law of Refugee 
Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 1991 ). 
18 This definition comes from James C Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 
1991)10 and was adopted by the Refugee Status Appeals Authority in Refugee Appeal No 1039 93 Re HBS 
and LBY ( 13 February 1995) 19 - 20. See also Refugee Appeal 71./2 7 99 [2000] NZAR 545 at para 51. 
19 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in International Law (2 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 35 . 
20 Goodwin-Gill, above, 77. 
9 
spontaneous refugees who make their claim for refugee status on arrival at the 
New Zealand border, or after entry into New Zealand.21 
3 Protection of re ju.gees 
Despite the fact that so few claimants are eventually accepted as genuine 
refugees, all claimants must receive the benefit of certain Convention provisions 
while their claim is being determined.22 This is because the definition is a 
declaratory statement. Refugee status exists as soon as the criteria in Article lA 
are met, and independently of recognition by State parties. As the UNHCR 
states, a refugee "does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is 
recognised because he is a refugee".23 This means that refugees are entitled to the 
rights in the Convention even before their status is recognised. Unless status 
assessment is virtually immediate, the only acceptable solution is for State parties 
to treat refugee status claimants as if they are genuine refugees and afford them 
their Convention rights.24 However, there is reason to suggest that where a 
refugee status claim is clearly not bona fide, such rights do not apply.
25 
Article 31.2 of the Convention protects spontaneous refugees from arbitrary 
detention. Article 31 states -
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entl)' or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territol)' where their life or freedom 
21 By contrast, quota refugees are selected, while still overseas, by the New Zealand government from 
countries predetermined by UNHCR for resettlement in New Zealand. For the most part these refugees are 
part of a mass movement provoked by invasion or oppression. New Zealand currently accepts 750 UN 
quota refugees . (Rodger Haines "International Law and Refugees in New Zealand" [1999) NZ Law Rev 
120, 125). 
22 The statistics relating to refugee status claimant applications demonstrate that the Convention definition 
of"refugee" is not an easy test to satisfy. In the year 2000 - 2001, only 13 .2 % of the 2350 refugee status 
applications decided by the Refugee Status Branch in New Zealand were accepted, with 86.8% declined. 
bStatistics found at <http://www.refugee.org.nz/stats/htm#Table%203> (last accessed 9 July 2002)). 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979), para 28. 
24 Rodger Haines "International Law and Refugees in New Zealand" [1999) NZ Law Rev 120, 129 citing 
Professor JC Hathaway and R A Neve. 
25 Atle Grahl Madsen Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Division of International Protection of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1997) I 80. 
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was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without 
authorisation, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show 
good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions 
other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until 
their status in the country is regularised or they obtain admission into another country. 
The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the 
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country. (Emphasis added) 
It has been argued that the words "such refugees" in Article 31.2 refer back to 
Article 31.1, whose requirements must also be satisfied in order to claim 
protection under Article 31.2.26 If this argument were accepted, refugees would 
need to show that they (a) came directly from a persecuting country; (b) 
immediately reported their refugee claim to airport authorities before their entry 
was discovered to be illegal; and (c) had good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence (although this should be a low standard, considering the difficulties 
inherent in determining this at the airport).27 Support for this interpretation comes 
from the UNHCR itself via the Guidelines. 28 
However, such an interpretation would severely limit the scope of Article 
31.2. There is no support in the travaux preparatoires for this approach, and 
others have argued that "such refugees" means simply people who enter or are 
present in a territory unlawfully and who claim refugee status.29 
26 Asher Davidson Article 31 (2) of the Refugee Convention and its Implementation in New Zealand: Is 
Detention Defensible? (LLB(Hons) Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2000) para 21 -28. 
27 Davidson, above, para 30 -33 , 43 . See also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in International Law (2 
ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 249. 
28 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers, 1999 Introduction, para 2. 
29 Atle Grahl Madsen Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Division of International Protection of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1997) 179 - 180. 
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In New Zealand there has been no authoritative comment as yet as to which 
interpretation is preferred.30 
In either case, Article 31.2 which requires greater justification for detention of 
refugees than other illegal aliens. 
(a) Detention 
"Detention" has been defined by the UNHCR Revised Guidelines on 
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of A.sylum Seekers31 
(the Guidelines) as 
confinement within a narrowly bounded or restricted location, including prisons, closed 
camps, detention facilities or airport transit zones, where freedom of movement is 
substantially curtailed, and where the only opportunity to leave this limited area is to 
leave the territory. 32 
In its framework paper on the detention of asylum seekers and refugees, the 
UNHCR makes it clear that their detention "raises significant concerns", and is to 
be avoided.33 Most asylum seekers have not committed crimes, nor are they 
suspected of having done so. Furthermore, refugees and asylum seekers are in a 
special situation in that they are fleeing persecution and may be unable to enter a 
country legally.34 The fact that someone has entered a Contracting State's 
territory illegally does not prohibit them fulfilling the Convention definition of 
refugee, or enjoying the benefits this entitles them to. The Conference of 
30 See Abu v Superintendent of Mount Eden Women's Prison [2000) NZAR 260 (HC) para 15 where the 
Crown argued that the former more restrictive approach applied. However, this approach was neither 
adopted nor dismissed by the Court. 
31 Note that although the guidelines may be relevant for interpretation purposes - particularly for judges 
exercising their discretion under ssl28 and 128A, they do not have the same status as the Conclusions of 
the Executive Committee of the UNHCR and do not impose obligations on the Minister in considering 
applications for temporary permits by refugee status claimants: See Attomey General v E [2000] 3 NZLR 
257 (CA) para 39 (majority). 
32 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers (February 1999) Guideline 1. 
33 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Standing Committee Detention of Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended Practice ( 4 June 1999) para 1. 
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Plenipotentiaries expressly rejected the submission that fraudulent entrants be 
excluded from protection, as Article 31 demonstrates.35 The right to liberty is a 
fundamental human right.36 
Detention is arbitrary when it is not in accordance with the law, or the law 
allows for arbitrary practices, or the law is enforced in an arbitrary way. This can 
include random, capricious, and disproportionate practices of detention, or where 
its duration is indefinite or there is no fair and efficient review procedure 
available.37 To avoid arbitrariness, detention must be clearly prescribed by law, 
free from inappropriateness or injustice and accessible to all.38 
Arbitrary detention is a human rights violation, and can be a form of 
persecution.39 This provides further justification for the prohibition on arbitrary 
detention by a Contracting State. If a person is entitled to refugee status on the 
basis that they are fleeing arbitrary detention, it would seem bizarre if the 
Contracting State in which they seek refuge was then able to arbitrarily detain 
them. 
(b) "Necessary" restrictions under Article 31.2 
Article 31 clearly states that restrictions on movement are permitted where 
necessary. The Executive Committee Conclusion No 44 (XXXVII) - 1986 
Detention of Refagees and Asylum Seekers defines when detention may be 
necessary under Article 31.40 These grounds must be prescribed by law and are 
limited to verifying identity, determining the elements on which the claim to 
refugee status or asylum is based, dealing with cases where refugees or asylum 
34 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner' s Programme Standing Committee Detention of Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended Practice ( 4 June 1999) para 1. 
35 James C Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 199 l) 50 -51 . 
36 See ICCPR Article 9(1) and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s22. 
37 Executive Committee The Framework above, para 10. 
38 Executive Committee The Framework above, para 10. 
39 Hathaway, above, 113 . 
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seekers have destroyed their travel and/ or identity documents or have used 
fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they 
intend to claim asylum, and the protection of national security or public order. 
The Guidelines make clear that the grounds where detention may be 
"necessary" are narrowly confined.41 Verification of identity cannot be used to 
justify detention for the entire status determination process, or for an unlimited 
period of time. As for asylum seekers without documents, their detention is only 
necessary where there has been an intention to deceive, and should not occur 
simply for the reason that they have been unable to obtain the necessary 
documentation due to the circumstances of their persecution. 
Detention to protect national security is only necessary where evidence shows 
that the asylum seeker has a criminal record or affiliations, and cannot be used as 
part of a policy to deter future asylum seekers or to dissuade others from 
continuing their claims. Detention is not to be used as a punitive or disciplinary 
measure for illegal entry or presence in a country.42 
It follows that measures applied must not go beyond what is necessary in a 
particular circumstance. If there are few illegal entrants, detention is harder to 
justify than in cases of massive influx where the authorities are overwhelmed and 
need to detain in order to investigate the basis for the claims.43 Article 31.2 
obliges Contracting States to differentiate their restrictive measures according to 
40 The Court of Appeal in Attorney General v E [2000] 3 NZLR 257 at 269 para 38 (majority), para 94 
(Thomas J) recognised the authority of the Executive Committee in New Zealand. 
41 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers (February 1999) Guideline 3. Note that although the guidelines may be relevant for interpretation 
purposes - particularly for judges exercising their discretion under ss 128 and 128A, they do not have the 
same status as the Conclusions of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, . Nor do they impose 
obligations on the Minister in considering applications for temporary permits by refugee status claimants. 
However, while they are not a binding international instrument, the Guidelines are part of the environment 
in which other more direct sources of law may be better understood. See A ltomey General v E [2000] 3 
NZLR 257 (CA) para 39 (majority), and Abu v Superintendent of Mt Eden Women'.5 Prison [2000]NZAR 
260, para 37(HC). 
42 UNHCR Revised Guidelines, above, Guideline 3. 
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the circumstances. If a less severe restriction, such as ordering a refugee claimant 
to stay within a certain region, is available, this should always be employed first.44 
The Guidelines state that detention should be the exception, rather than the 
rule, and alternatives to detention should always be considered first. This requires 
individual assessment of the personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, and the 
local conditions.45 
4 An appropriate balance? 
It may be thought that the Convention places too much weight on refugee 
rights and, if enforced, would leave little room for security measures. But I do not 
subscribe to that view. Instead, I suggest that the Convention represents an 
appropriate balance between the two. If anything it could be adjusted in favour of 
refugee status claimants.46 
It is true that Article 31.2 requires greater justification for detention of 
refugees than other illegal aliens. However, it does not oblige a State to admit 
any refugee claimant into its territory.47 While protecting refugees, the 
Convention also recognises the right of States to control their borders. Just 
43 Atle Grahl Madsen Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Division of International Protection of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1997) 181 . 
44 Grahl Madsen , above, 182. 
45 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers (February 1999) Guideline 4. 
46 Andrew Langham describes the rights conferred by the Convention on refugees as weak, providing only 
limited guarantees ("The Erosion of Refugee Rights in Australia"(l999) 8 Pac Rim L & Poly .651 ,653 .) It 
is certainly true that while many states pay lip service to the Convention, they invest considerable resources 
to keeping refugees away from their borders - for example Australia's (a State Party to the Convention since 
1954) dealings with the Tampa refugees. For a discussion of the legislative changes brought in at that time 
see Emily C Peyser "'Pacific Solution'? The Sinking Right to Seek Asylum in Australia" (2002) 11 Pac 
Rim L & Poly 431 ; Alexander J Wood "The 'Pacific Solution' : Refugees Unwelcome in Australia" (2002) 
9 Hum Rts Br 22; and Parliament of Australia, Department of the Parliamentary Library "Refugee Law -
Recent Legislative Developments" Current Issues Brief 5 2001-02 found at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/1ibrary/pubs/cib/2001-02/02cib05 .htm#top> (last accessed 1 March 2002). 
For a comparison between New Zealand and Australian refugee law see Jeanne Donald "We Don't Know 
How Lucky We Are, Mate: Australian and New Zealand Refugee Law- A Comparison" (12 April 2002) 
available at <http ://www.refugee.org.nz/lucky .html> (last accessed 22 May 2002). 
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fulfilling the Convention definition of "refugee" is, in itself, hard to do, as the 
statistics show .48 But the State parties went further and were careful to avoid 
granting refugee status to either war criminals or those who might endanger the 
internal security of asylum countries, even if they otherwise fulfil the Convention 
definition.49 Further protection of national security is found in articles 9-5°, 3251 and 
33.2.52 
By g1vmg effect to their Convention obligations, State parties are not 
curtailing their right to protect their borders, but are undertaking to do it in a fair 
way. 
The next question to be considered is to what extent the Immigration Act of 
New Zealand gives effect to these obligations, and the balance contained in them. 
B Extent to Which the Refugee Convention 1951 is Incorporated Into Domestic 
Law by the Immigration Amendment Act 1999 
1 Direct incorporation 
New Zealand acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees on 30 June 1960,53 and the 1%7 Protocol on 6 August 1973.54 
47 Atle Grahl Madsen Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Division of International Protection of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1997) 167. 
48
. In the year 2000 - 2001, only 13.2 % of the 2350 refugee status applications decided by the Refugee 
Status Branch in New Zealand were accepted, with 86.8% declined. [Statistics found at 
<http://www.refugee.org.nz/stats/htm#Table%203> (last accessed 9 July 2002)). 
49 See James C Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 1991) 214 onwards. 
50 Article 9 allows a Contracting State, in time of war or olher grave and exceptional circumstances, to take 
provisional measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular 
person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the 
continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security ( emphasis added). 
51 Article 32 states that refugees may not be expelled from a Contracting State, except on grounds of 
national security or public order (emphasis added). 
52 Article 33 .2 allows Contracting State to expel or return (refouler) a refugee for whom there are 
reasonable grounds to regard as a danger to the security of a country in which he is seeking asylum, or a 
refugee who has been a convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, and constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country . 
53 New Zealand Treaty Series 1961 , No. 2. 
54 New Zealand Treaty Series 1973, No. 21 . 
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However, it was not until 1999 that there was any reference to these 
international instruments in the Immigration Act. Section 60 of the Immigration 
Amendment Act, which came into force that year, attached the Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol to form the 6th Schedule of the Act. 
But this does not necessarily mean, however, that a breach of its provisions 
will constitute a basis for a direct cause of action in the New Zealand Courts. The 
orthodox position is that conventions are only directly enforceable in domestic 
law where they have been expressly adopted. Mere annexation as a schedule is 
not usually enough to do this, although Professor Burrows suggests that if it can 
be shown that Parliament's intent in annexing the Convention was to enact it, this 
could be enough.ss 
The parliamentary debates show confusion among the members as to what 
Parliament's intent was. Speeches of some members in the early debates about 
the Amendment Act indicate an assumption that the Convention and Protocol 
were to be "directly incorporated into our domestic law"56• However, at the third 
reading the then Minister of Immigration, Tuariki Delamere, said he saw three 
objectives of the legislation, the third of which was "a statutory refugee regime", 
rather than direct incorporation. 57 
Nor is there anything in the Immigration Act itself to suggest direct 
incorporation. There is no express provision directly incorporating the 
Convention. In fact, Parliament expressly rejected UNHCR's submission to the 
Social Services Select Committee that section 129D be amended to give the 
Convention the force of law .58 Instead section l29D merely requires that a 
refugee status officer and the Refugee Status Appeals Authority " act in a manner 
55 JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths Wellington 1999) 258 . 
56 M Robson, MP (29 September 1998) 572 NZPD 12796. 
57 (30 March 1999) 576 NZPD l 5756. 
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that is consistent with New Zealand's obligations under the Refugee Convention" 
- something much less that what the UNHCR was after. 
The fact that certain Articles of the Convention have been implemented, such 
as the Article 33.1 prohibition on refoulement in section 129 X,59 is further 
evidence that the Convention as a whole has not been adopted, as if it had there 
would be no need to do this. 
In such cases where only part of an international document has been 
incorporated, the traditional approach is that it has been annexed for information 
only, and has not been directly adopted into New Zealand's domestic law. 
Nevertheless, the remaining provisions may still have some legal force.60 
2 Relevance of the Convention, particularly Article 31 .2 
While not expressly incorporated, it is obvious from the Immigration Act that 
the Convention has some application in New Zealand law. For example, the 
Convention definition of "refugee" has been adopted by section 129F of the Act. 
Furthermore, under section 129D(l) refugee status officers and the Refugee 
Status Appeals Authority are required to act in a manner that is consistent with 
New Zealand's obligations under the Refugee Convention when carrying out their 
functions under Part VIA [Refugee Status Determinations]. 
It could be argued that the relevance of the Convention is limited to Part VIA 
of the Immigration Act which contains direct references to it and was inserted at 
the same time as the Convention by the Immigration Amendment Act 1999. This 
58 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "Submission to the Social Services Committee on the 
Immigration Amendment Bill 1998" (16 November 1998) para 2. 
59 Protection against refoulement is one of the fundamental protections afforded to Refugees by the 
Convention. It is contained in Article 33 which states that State Parties shall not expel or return a refugee 
to a territory where his or her life or freedom is threatened because of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 
18 
would mean that Article 31.2 would not be relevant, as the prov1s10ns under 
which refugees are detained in New Zealand are not in Part VIA where the 
Convention has been most obviously implemented. However, section 129 X of 
the Immigration Act states that 
(2) In carrying out their functions under this Act in relation to a refugee or refugee status 
claimant, immigration officers must have regard to the provisions of this Part and of the 
Refugee Convention.61 
This shows that the Convention is a relevant consideration for discretionary 
decision making throughout the Act. 62 It is to be taken into account, not only 
when determining refugee status applications, but in the exercise of all functions, 
including consideration of applications for temporary permits, removal of persons 
unlawfully in New Zealand and associated powers of detention.63 It has even 
been called "legislative adoption of Article 31 ".64 
So while Article 31.2 has not been directly imported into the Act, as Article 
32.1 and 33.2 have been,65 it would be directly relevant to Immigration Officers' 
powers of detention under the Act and should be had regard to according to 
section 129X(2). 
As discussed earlier, Article 31 requires that refugees not be detained except 
where necessary. However, as the Immigration Act prior to its 2002 amendments 
only provided for two options: detention or release with a permit, to find that they 
could not be detained would, in effect, give the right to a permit.66 This would be 
inconsistent with section 9 of the Act, which states that no person is of right 
6° KJ Keith "New Zealand Treaty Practice: The Executive and the Legislature" (1964) l NZULR 273, 298. 
See also the discussion of ways in which treaties can be relevant in JF Burrows Statute Law in New 
Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths Wellington 1999) 293 - 298. 
61 S 129X is found in Part VIA, which was inserted by s 40 of the Immigration Amendment Act 1999. 
62 Hon Justice Baragwanath "Judicial Review and Administrative Law Issues Arising in Refugee Law 
Cases in New Zealand" (Conference oflnternational Association of Refugee Law Judges, Auckland, 10 
March 2000) 4 <http ://www.lawcom.govt .nzJcontent/speeches/jud%20rev%rolaw°/o20cases%20wdb-
4apr.htm> (last accessed 31 March 2002). 
63 Attorney General v E (2000) 3 NZLR 257, para 44 (Majority, CA). 
64 Baragwanath , above, 8. 
65 Immigration Act 1987, sl29X(1). 
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entitled to a temporary permit. It is also inconsistent with the Court of Appeal's 
decision in Attorney General v E.67 
Furthermore, as recognised in Refagee Council of New Zealand Inc & the 
Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand Incorporated and D v 
Attorney General,68 (discussed in the next section of this paper) section 128 of the 
Immigration Act allows for detention whenever someone arrives in New Zealand 
illegally. As this is largely the case for spontaneous refugee claimants, the Act 
obviously envisages their detention. 
Thus the question must be asked, whether, despite section 129X(2), other 
provisions in the Act implicitly prevent the recognition of Article 31.2 in New 
Zealand. 
Since the scheduled Convention is part of the Act, it must be read with it. If 
there is an inconsistency between the Act and the scheduled document, as in this 
case, the Courts will do their best to reconcile it, taking into account the nature of 
both the schedule and the inconsistency .69 Scheduling the Convention enables the 
Court to resolve uncertainties in the legislation by referring to the Convention.70 
While there is some authority to suggest that if the words of a domestic statute are 
clear, the treaty which it implements cannot affect its interpretation,71 this view is 
not favoured by commentators.72 According to Professor Burrows, the New 
Zealand courts adopt a more liberal approach to the use of extrinsic evidence and 
66 Asher Davidson Article 31 (2) of the Refugee Convention and its Jmpleme11tation i11 New Zeala11d: Is 
Detention Defensible? (LLB(Hons) Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2000) para 112. 
67 (2000) 3 NZLR 257 (Majority). 
68 (27 June 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881-AS01. 
69 JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths Wellington 1999) 258. 
70 Wharton v the Registrar of Patents, Designs & Trademarks[l 921] NZLR 817 (CA) regarding the Treaty 
of Versailles, discussed in KJ Keith "New Zealand Treaty Practice: The Executive and the Legislature" 
P964] 1 NZULR 273,298. 
1 Ellerman Lines Ltd v Murray [193 I] AC 126 (HL ). 
72 See JF Burrows, above, 294 and KJ Keith "New Zealand Treaty Practice: The Executive and the 
Legislature" [1964] 1 NZULR 273, 299. 
20 
will not require too much persuasion to deem that the words of the domestic 
legislation are unclear.73 
It is also important to remember that the Courts strive to give practical effect 
to international covenants, especially those concerning human rights, even in the 
absence of their incorporation into domestic law .74 Some international obligations 
are so manifestly important that they must be taken into account in decision 
making. Otherwise New Zealand's commitment to these obligations appears to be 
mere "window dressing", an outcome that the Courts will do their best to avoid.75 
Moreover, at a Ministerial meeting of States Parties on 13 December last year, 
New Zealand reaffirmed its commitment to implement its obligations under the 
Refugee Convention fully and effectively, in accordance with the object and 
purpose of the Convention and the 1967 Protocol.76 This cannot be said to be 
meaningless. 
New Zealand could have specifically adopted the Convention, and in 
particular Article 31. It chose not to do so. This has led to some uncertainty in 
the application of the Immigration Act. In Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc 
& the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand Incorporated and D v 
Attorney General Baragwanath J attempted to reconcile Article 31.2 and the 
scheme of the Immigration Act in his interpretation of section 128(5). The 
Immigration Amendment Act 2002 also addresses this issue. 
73 JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths Wellington 1999) 249. 
74 Right Hon Dame Sian Elias CJ "The Impact oflntemational Covenants on Domestic Law" (Inaugural 
Meeting International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Auckland, l O March 2000) para 11- 12 
<http://www.refugee.org.nz/IARLJ3-00Elias.html> (last accessed 22 May 2002). 
15 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [ 1994] 2 NZLR 257, 266 (CA). 
76 Found at <http://w\, \\ .rcfugce.org.nL.larchivc'.2001.htm# l3%20Dcccmber%'.W'.200 la> (last accessed 7 
August 2002). 
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IV REFUGEE COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND INC & THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
INCORPORATED AND D V ATTORNEY GENERAL (2002) 77 
In this case, the Refugee Council and the Human Rights Foundation joined a 
former refugee claimant, "D", to challenge a Crown policy introduced on 19 
September 2001 in response to the events of September 11 that year.78 This 
policy consisted of detaining under section 128 of the Immigration Act most 
claimants for refugee status while their claim was being determined. In fact, 
between October 1999 and September 2001 less than 5% of refugee status 
claimants were detained in custody on their arrival in New Zealand. After the 
change in policy, 94% were detained79 - obviously a significant change in policy! 
Baragwanath J determined the immediate issue of the refugees' detention by 
stating that they were entitled to apply to a District Court Judge for bail under 
section 128A of the Immigration Act. This was despite the fact that were 
detained under section 128 which states, at subsection 15, that bail shall not be 
granted. He considered that the 
absence of bail power equivalent to that found in other sections of the Act dealing with 
criminals for example, indicated that it was of summary character and easily overridden 
where inconsistent with a context - here that of those who are subject to Part VIA [refugee 
status claimants], and who enjoy the protection of ss129X(2) and l29D [that the Refugee 
Convention be taken into account] ; and with the presumptions of the common law and the Bill 
ofRights.80 
77 (31 May 2002 Interim Judgment) (27 June 2002 Supplementary Judgment) High Court Auckland 
M1881-AS01 , Baragwanath J. 
78 This change in Crown Policy was announced via a New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS) 
Operational Instruction issued by the General Manager. Under the Immigration Act 1987, s 13 the 
Government is required to publish its immigration policy generally, and this is given effect to by the NZIS 
Manual published at <http://www.immigration .govt.co nz>which is updated quarterly . Amendments may 
be found at this website, or can be sent directly to registered recipients. 
19 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (31 May 2002 - interim decision, 27 June 2002 - final decision) High Court 
Auckland M1881-AS01, para 17. 
80 Refugee Council v AG , (31 May 2002) above, ,para 64. 
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Baragwanath J then went on to consider whether refugees should be detained 
at all under section 128, and if so what was the scope for doing so. He also 
considered the validity of the Operational Instruction and its policy of detention. 
His judgment merits detailed consideration, dealing with each of the issues 
covered by him. First, the application of section 128. 
A Reading of Section 128 
1 The application of section 128 to refugees 
Section 128 allows for the detention in custody of any person who is not 
exempt from the requirement to have a permit and who arrives in New Zealand 
and is refused a permit, or fails to apply for one. Detention is allowed pending 
that person' s departure from New Zealand on the first available craft. 
Literally read, as the Crown submitted it should be,81 section 128 applies to 
every person, who arrives in New Zealand and who is refused a permit. This 
would necessarily include refugee status claimants. 
However, the consequences of reading section 128 in such a way, entails a 
breach of our international obligations. Under section 129X of the Immigration 
Act, refugee status claimants cannot be deported while their claim is being 
determined, unless the provisions of Articles 32.1, or 33 .2 of the Convention 
allow it. Accordingly, the Crown' s submission effectively meant that "detain in 
custody pending departure on the first available craft" could mean indefinite 
detention for refugees while their status was being determined. As noted 
previously, the UNHCR Guidelines expressly deemed that while detention for 
81 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland MJ 881-ASOJ , para 20. 
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administrative reasons such as to verify identity may be necessary and allowable, 
this is not so if the detention lasts the entire determination period.82 
Justice Baragwanath rejected the Crown's invitation to follow Anderson J's 
decision in F v Superintendent of Mt Eden Prison83 that so long as the underlying 
purpose of the departure remains, "the first available craft" means the first 
available craft after a refugee status claim has been denied.8-l He did so on the 
basis that he had heard much fuller argument and had to form his own view. 
Capitalising on this apparent inconsistency in the Crown case, the plaintiff's 
argued that section 128 could not have been intended to apply to refugee status 
claimants, as it is a "turn around provision" and detention is only warranted 
pending departure on the next available craft. To say that detention pending 
determination of their claim is detention pending their departure on the first 
available craft was stretching the language, they said. 85 
As further proof that section 128 does not apply, the plaintiffs relied on 
subsection 15, which refuses bail to those who fall within section 128. They 
argued that Parliament would not have intended to put refugees in a worse 
position than criminals, persons deemed a security risk, and persons about to be 
deported, who are all entitled to bail. Article 31.2 of the Convention allows 
limitations on movement only where necessary, but section 128 prohibits bail 
even without consideration of whether bail is necessary or not. 86 They argued 
that to find that refugee status claimants are subject to section 128 would be 
82 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers (February 1999) Guideline 3. 
83 [1999] NZAR 420. 
84 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881-AS01, para 21 . 
85 Refugee Council v A G .. (31 May 2002), above, para 21 . 
86 Refugee Council v AG,, (31 May 2002), above, para 49. 
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contrary to Article 31.2 of the Refugee Convention 1951 and the Bill of Rights 
Act.87 
Moreover, smce section 128 was not altered by the 1999 amendments 
concerning refugees, the plaintiffs said it should be read as if it was under the 
original 1987 Act which did not concern refugees.88 
Benipal v Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration,89 was also advanced in 
support exclusion of refugees from section 128. However, Baragwanath J 
distinguished that case on the basis that it was decided under the old Immigration 
Act 1964 and legislative changes over the past 38 years had rendered the decision 
obsolete.90 
Baragwanath J thought that the fundamental problem with the plaintiff's 
submission that section 128 had no application to refugees, was that it would 
mean that "every person who arrives in New Zealand" does not mean "every 
person" at all. 91 It would also grant 42 days liberty to anyone who arrives in New 
Zealand and claims refugee status. National security would be threatened, as this 
would allow fraudsters and criminals ample opportunity to commit whatever 
terrorist, criminal or other antisocial behaviour which founds the basis of their 
desire to enter New Zealand, thus encouraging abusive claims. As Baragwanath J 
observed: 
All that is needed is the cry "Open Sesame" in the form "I claim refugee status" which 
such people would soon learn in the unlikely event that they did not know it already
92 
87 Refugee Counci I of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of A otearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881-AS01, para 21. 
88 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG ( 27 June 2002), High Court Auckland Ml881-AS01, para 153, but was later 
rejected by Baragwanath J at para 186. 
89 (16 December 1985) High Court Auckland, A878/83, Chilwell J. 
90 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002) above, para 189. 
91 Refugee Council v AG (31 May 2002) , above, para 21. 
92 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above, para 168. 
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Baragwanath J was thus faced with two positions demonstrating the problems 
with section 128, but neither of which was satisfactory in itself. The Crown's 
submission involved breach of our international obligations, while the plaintiffs 
submission cut across the ordinary meaning of the statute. 
Despite his initial reservations about determining the proper construction of 
section 128 while legislation dealing directly with this matter was before the 
House,93 Baragwanath J ultimately held that section 128 does apply to refugee 
status claimants. In doing so, however, he rejected the Crown's submission that 
the amendments could inform the construction of section 128 prior to their 
insertion. He regarded such a proposition as contrary to section 7 of the 
Interpretation Act that Acts do not have retrospective effect, and inconsistent with 
the Crown's acceptance of this principle.94 
In order to apply section 128(5) to refugee status claimants, Baragwanath J 
interpreted it as saying 
... any person to whom this section applies may be detained by any member of the Police 
and placed in custody pending that person ' s departure form New Zealand on the first 
available craft [provided that in the case of a refugee status claimant the period of 
detention may continue until the determination of the application). 
95 
This was considered necessary in order to balance the dual purposes of the 
Immigration Amendment Act 1999 as expressed in its introduction.96 
An Act to-
93 See the Transnational Organised Crime Bill 2002, which was divided at its 3rd reading into several parts. 
On 18 June 2002 (in the period between the interim and supplementary judgments) the Immigration 
Amendment Act 2002 came into force and this changed the position relating to s 128. These changes are 
discussed in the next section of the paper. 
94 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (27 June 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881-AS01 , para 139, 161. 
9s Refugee Cmmcil v AG (27 June 2002) above, para 169. 
Incidentally refugee status claimants require at least five weeks for Police and SIS to process security 
checks (Refugee Council notes of meeting with Minister 14/02/02 as cited in Human Rights Foundation of 
Aotearoa New Zealand & Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc "Freedom's Ramparts on the Sea " The 
Detention of Asylum Seekers in New Zealand (May 2002) 7 <http.//www.humanrights.co.nz> (last 
accessed 27 August 2002). 
96 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above. para 179. 
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(a) Improve the effectiveness of the removal regime for persons unlawfully in New 
Zealand by streamlining the purposes involved ... 
(b) Create a statutory framewor:· for determining refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention ... . 
Although he acknowledged that this reading of section 128(5) requires an 
element of distortion of language, he justified it on the basis of the history of the 
legislation. 97 In his opinion, section 128 must not be interpreted in isolation, but 
as part of the entire statute, including Part VIA concerning refugee status 
determinations. 98 
2 Construction of the detention powers under section 128( 5) 
Despite failing on the first issue as to whether section 128 applied to 
refugees, the plaintiffs succeeded on the second issue. Baragwanath J accepted 
their submission that section 128(5) must be interpreted as requiring an 
immigration officer to exercise a true discretion whether to detain, having regard 
to the provisions of Part VIA (dealing with Refugee determinations) and the 
Convention, as required by section 129X(2).99 
He held that section 128(5), when applied to Refugee status claimants, is to be 
interpreted as saying 
Subject to subsection (7) of this section, any person to who this section applies may be 
detained by any member of the Police and placed in custody pending that person 's 
departure from New Zealand on the first available craft [only if and so long as the 
necessity test of Article 31.2 is satisfied, being a matter to which the immigration officer 
97 Justice Baragwanath considered the legislative response to D v Minister of immigration [ 199 l] 2 NZLR 
673 and the 1999 Amendment inserting Part VIA in particular. Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the 
Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand Incorporated and D v AG (27 June 2002) High Court 
Auckland M1881-AS01 , para 183 . 
98 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above, para 186. 
99 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002) , above, para 190. 
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exercising discrehon to request such detention is required by s 129X(2) to have 
regard] 100 
The result is that the language of section 128 is given effect to, in that it does 
apply to "every person", but there is no unnecessary detention if the discretion is 
properly used. This discretion is "iterative", in that if a refugee is detained, the 
decision must be constantly reviewed and the necessity test re-applied as fresh 
evidence emerges and circumstances change. 101 
Baragwanath J recognised that this led to a somewhat strained construction of 
the legislation, but thought it was necessary in order to give effect to both of the 
important purposes of the legislation. 102 
3 Discussion 
This case demonstrates the awkwardness that results from legislation that tries 
to cover too much. Refugees have special concerns, and deserve special 
treatment, different from that which is appropriate for other aliens. But despite 
repeated opportunities, Parliament has declined to accept the suggestion of the 
Court of Appeal in D v Minister of lmmigration103 that specific legislation for 
detention of refugees be enacted; instead it has maintained the current framework 
through several amendments. 104 
100 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aolearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (27 June 2002) High Court Auckland M1881 -AS01 , para 202. 
101 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above, para 203 . 
102 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above, para 207. 
103 (1991) 2 NZLR 673 (CA). 
104 For a discussion of Refugee legislation in Australia, see Emily C Peyser "'Pacific Solution'? The 
Sinking Right to Seek Asylum in Australia" (2002) 11 Pac Rim L & Poly 431 , and Parliament of Australia, 
Department of the Parliamentary Library "Refugee Law - Recent Legislative Developments" Current 
Issues Brief5 2001-02 found at <hltp://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/200 J-02/02cib05 .htm#top> (last 
accessed 1 March 2002). 
For a comparison between New Zealand and Australian refugee law see Jeanne Donald "We Don't Know 
How Lucky We Are, Mate: Australian and New Zealand Refugee Law- A Comparison" (12 April 2002) 
available at <http ://www.refugee.org.nz/lucky .html> (last accessed 22 May 2002). 
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These difficulties have long been recognised, and a determination by the 
Courts was overdue. Baragwanath J's approach of requiring the necessity test of 
Article 31.2 to be considered before refugee status claimants are detained, meets 
concerns about the broad discretion under section 128 to a large extent. Whatever 
else may be said, his approach is an improvement on the pre-existing position and 
the ultimate outcome, of a presumption against detention, is to be applauded. 
However, while the statement that the test is iterative would seem to allay 
concerns about indefinite detention, there is some scepticism about the practical 
application of the test. Will the Judges in fact apply it, or merely extend the 
warrants of commitment almost unquestioningly, as seems to happen at present. 
Baragwanath J accepted evidence from barristers that in extending warrants of 
commitment, District Court Judges have invariably followed New Zealand 
Immigration Department v Cindy Abu105 to the effect that section 128(13B) does 
not confer a discretion but an obligation to extend the warrant. This means that 
the seven day review period is little more than "rubber stamping" .106 Despite the 
faith placed in it by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v E, 107 this is not an 
effective check on powers of detention. 
Another query about Baragwanath J's approach concerns the linguistic 
contortions required to implement his test, which could, perhaps, have been 
avoided. This argument relates to his dismissal of the plaintiffs submission that 
refugee status claimants should be detained under section l28B rather than 
section 128 itself. He considered that section l28B offered no practical advantage 
for refugees. He pointed out that even if it is determined that the person is not one 
to whom section 7(1) [persons inelligible for grant of permit] applies, the person, 
unless granted a permit, is liable under subsection (5)(a)(ii) to be dealt with under 
section 128 anyway. Furthermore, he said, if they are dealt with under section 
105 (District Court Otahuhu 13 October 1999). 
'
06 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D vAG (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland M1881-AS01 , para 101 - 102. 
107 (2000) 3 NZLR 257, para 48 (CA)(Majority). 
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128B they are not eligible for bail, even if judicial review proceedings under 
section 128A are commenced, which puts them in a worse position than if 
processed under section 128. Thus, he considered, even if detained under section 
128B, Article 31.2 would not be complied with. 103 
Baragwanath J failed to appreciate the real point of the submission. If refugees 
were only able to be detained under section 129B, and not section 128, they 
would only be detained where there are reasonable grounds to do so. Section 
129B allows for detention where the person is suspected of terrorism, or is a 
criminal, or generally a risk to New Zealand as set out in section 7(1). The 
plaintiffs admitted that refugee claimants who fall under section 7(1) probably 
should be detained. But where no such grounds exist, they argued that detention 
should not be used. If used in this way, Baragwanath J's fears about criminals and 
fraudsters making unfounded claims and being set loose on New Zealand are 
shown to be unfounded as such people would still be caught by section 128B. 
Such an approach would also be consistent with Article 31.2, which permits 
detention where necessary. 
There is evidence to suggest that section 129B was not used by NZIS officials 
because it was thought to require a higher threshold of reasonable grounds, and 
thus more difficult to detain people under it. 109 However, convenience of the 
NZIS should not be sufficient reason to ignore refugee claimants' rights. As 
previously interpeted, section 128 gave too broad a discretion to detain and did 
not take into account the individual circumstances of refugees; it therefore should 
not have been used. But, if section 128B had been used all along as the only 
108 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (27 June 2002) High Court Auckland Ml 881-ASOl, para 176 
109 Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand & Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc 
"Freedom's Ramparts on the Sea" The Detention of Asylum Seekers in New Zealand (May 2002) 5 
<http: //www.humanrights.co.nz> (last accessed 27 August 2002). 
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provision to detain refugees, then the changes to section 128 would have been to a 
large part unnecessary .110 
Even if it is accepted that Baragwanath J chose the right approach m 
modifying section 128 rather than using section 128B, concerns remain. In 
particular, the decision may conflict with the Court of Appeal judgment m 
Attorney General v E. 111 
In E v Attorney General112 thirteen plaintiffs arrived in New Zealand over a 
period and claimed refugee status on arrival. They also applied for temporary 
entry permits pending determination of their claims. Their applications were 
denied and they were detained in prison. They challenged their decision relating 
to the temporary permits by way of judicial review. 
In the High Court Fisher J ordered NZIS to reconsider the claims, holding that 
the plaintiff's legitimate expectation was breached in that NZIS failed to consider 
the presumption that temporary permits should be granted to refugees in the 
absence of special factors to make detention necessary. 
This decision was overturned in the Court of Appeal, where the majority 
(Richardson P, Gault, Henry and Keith JJ) held that while the Immigration 
officers had to consider the provisions of the Convention and the Immigration 
Act, there was nothing in either to require a presumptive approach in the 
110 The wording "every person" of s 128 would of course remain problematic, as would s 129B(5)(a)(ii). 
This states that where a detennination is made that s 7(1) does not apply, (that is the person does not fall 
into the categories of people ineligible for a permit), that person may be dealt with under s 128, which 
allows detention pending the next available flight. In such cases, as Baragwanath J points out, s129B 
would not be much more help than s128 itself. However, what Baragwanath J does not point out is that s 
129(5)(a)(i) provides an alternative to s 128 - that such people may be granted a permit and released 
immediately. Rather than distorting the language of s 128, it might have been easier to read in a 
presumption that refugee claimants will be dealt with under s 129(5)(a)(i) rather than s 129(5)(a)(ii). This 
would mean that refugee claimants who have been detained on the basis of security concerns, for example, 
which then tum out to be groundless, would be released into the community rather than detained under s 
128. 
111 (2000) 3 NZLR 257, para 48 (CA)(Majority). 
11 2 [2000) NZAR 354 (HC). 
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discretion of the Minister or his /her delegate to grant a temporary permit to a 
refugee status claimant, even if the UNHCR Guidelines were read in. 113 Nor did 
the NZIS Operational Manual require such an approach. 
As it stood at the time of both cases, section 128 only had two alternatives, 
detention or release into the community with a permit. By incorporating the 
presumption against detention in Article 31.2 into section 128 when considering 
asylum seekers, Baragwanath J effectively created a presumption in favour of 
granting a permit, which the Court of Appeal had previously rejected. This 
problem has, of course, been remedied for the future by the Immigration Act 
2002, which will be discussed later on in the paper. 
The Immigration Minister, Hon Lianne Dalziel, has announced that the Crown 
will appeal Baragwanath J's decision on the basis that his interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention was too narrow. 114 It will be interesting to see what happens, 
especially now that Thomas J, who delivered a strong dissent in Attorney General 
v E115alleging an "unacceptably minimalist" approach by the majority, has retired. 
B NZIS Operational Instruction Policy of Detention 
1 Baragwanath Jls decision 
The second ground for review m the Refugee Council case was that the 
manner in which the Crown exercises its responsibilities under the Immigration 
Act is unlawful in that it does not give due weight to Article 31.2 of the 
Convention. 11 6 
The Crown's policy of detaining refugees 
11 3 Attorney General v E [2000] 3 NZLR 257 para 47 per Richardson P, Gault, Henry and Keith JJ (CA). 
114 "Refugee Case Appeal" (1 July 2002) NZ Herald , Auckland, A3 
115 [2000] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). 
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where the identity .. . of a refugee statu claimant cannot be established [and there do not) 
appear particular reasons for allowing them to enter the community unrestricted117 
reverses the approach required by Article 31.2 of the Convention - that 
restrictions on movement should be no more than necessary. 118 The presumption 
in the former is of detention, with liberty in exceptional cases, whereas the latter 
requires the opposite. This also goes against the clear reluctance of Parliament to 
imprison claimants shown by section 114K(4)(c), which provides that refugee 
status claimants who are certified security risks are not only protected from 
deportation, but are also to be released from custody and given the appropriate 
temporary permit. 11 9 
Despite the fact that the UNHCR seemingly accepted the operational 
instruction in question, 120 Baragwanath J held that it was fundamentally defective. 
He construed it as dealing solely with detention, either in a penal institution or at 
the Mangere Centre. lt failed to give prior consideration to the third option 
required by Article 31.2 in terms of necessity .121 "Necessary" in Article 31.2 
means the minimum required on the facts as they appear to the immigration 
officer 
(1) to allow the Refugee Status Branch to be able to perform their functions (more 
than merely to facilitate the performance of their functions) 
(2) to avoid real risk of criminal offending 
(3) to avoid real risk of absconding. m 
Those at the Mangere Accommodation Centre are detained , as the centre's 
manual makes clear. However, the detention of refugee status claimants is not 
necessary for the refugee status branch to carry out its functions (albeit it may be 
11 6 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (27 June 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881-AS0l , para 163 . 
m As stated in the NZIS Operational Manual , Appendix 3. 
118 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D vAG (31 May 2002), High Court Auckland Ml88 I-AS01 , para 8. 
11 9 Refugee Council v AG (31 May 2002), above, para 59. 
120 Refugee Council v AG (31 May 2002), above, para 74. 
121 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above, para 208 - 210. 
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convenient). And while it may be necessary to prevent some claimants from 
absconding, it is in no way necessary for all, or even a great number of 
claimants. 123 Furthermore, if detention were necessary for this purpose, the 
"benign conditions" at the centre are not enough to prevent terrorism, crime or 
flight. 124 
Just because some refugee status claimants should be detained, does not mean 
that all must be. Therefore, Baragwanath J decided that their invariable automatic 
detention cannot be "necessary" 125 -
The necessity test should be, but under the current regime is not, applied meticulously. 
The exceptions to the current wholesale policy of detention are insignificant; what the 
law calls de minimis. Detention is essentially undiscriminating. If as I provisionally 
consider s 128A applies, such policy not only infringes Article 31.2 but falls outside the 
legitimate range of executive discretion available in terms of the Wednesbury and 
proportionality tests that engage judicial review... It probably also infringes the Bill of 
Rights .126 
The Crown's argument that detention is justified in order to protect the right 
to compel a carrier to remove a "turnaround" arrival without charge to the Crown 
under section 125 Immigration Act was rejected as a basis in itself for 
detention. 127 
2 Discussion 
It is obvious that Baragwanath J was right to condemn the Operational 
Instruction, as it goes against all that Article 31.2 stands for. Furthermore, in 
condemning the instruction, he was also condemning a worrying practice of 
122 Refugee Council v AG (27 June 2002), above, para 125 - 126. 
123 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
incorporated and D v AG (31 May 2002), High Court Auckland M 1881-ASO 1 para 85 . 
124 Refugee Council v AG (31 May 2002), above, para 108. 
125 Refugee Council v AG (31 May 2002), above, para 107. 
126 Refugee Council v AG (31 May 2002), above, para 111 . 
127 Refugee Councilv AG (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881-AS01 , para 30. 
successive New Zealand Governments to take overly protective measures in a 
panic response to perceived threats to national security. 
This trend can be identified in the security procedures adopted during the Gulf 
War for determining refugee status applications, which required the police to 
consider whether someone was not a threat to national security; if they could not 
be satisfied of this the claimant would be deported. The result was that asylum 
seekers were denied clearance on the basis that not enough was known about 
them, rather than that there were reasonable grounds for considering them a 
security threat under Article 33.2. 128 
The trend continued during the APEC conference in 1999, when all asylum 
seekers were detained in Auckland Central Remand Prison; a decision which 
drew international criticism.129 
And agam, the practice 1s apparent m the enactment of the Immigration 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1999. This Act was passed under urgency in response to 
the threatened arrival of 102 Chinese by boat. It implemented the detention 
provisions of the Immigration Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 at an earlier date than 
the rest of the Act, which gave refugees certain rights in the determination 
process, for example, and which counterbalanced the detention provisions. 
The parliamentary debates show evident dissatisfaction by oppostion MPs at 
this early partial enactment, which upset the balance of the Act. 
By picking out one part of the legislation - namely, the part relating to detention - we are 
encouraging the iron fist without encouraging the silk glove at the same time. That is 
why it is so wrong. So therefore what the Government is doing is bringing forward into 
128 Rodger Haines QC "International Law and Refugees in New Zealand" (1999] NZ Law Rev 120. 
129 Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand & Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc 
"Freedom 's Ramparts on the Sea "The Detention of Asy lum Seekers in New Zealand (May 2002) 23 
<http://www.humanrights.co.nz> (last accessed 27 August, 2002). 
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urgency only one part of what is comparatively balanced legislation. That is what is so 
fundamentally wrong about the way the Government is doing it. 130 
Politicians labelled it a panic move in response to the Chinese boat people, which 
required ignoring the spirit of the Refugee Convention. 131 
The measures taken in response to September 11 complete the quinella. 
Undoubtedly September 11 (and the earlier events) required a governmental 
response regarding immigration. To do so was not inconsistent with the Refugee 
Convention, which allows provisions to be made for national security. 132 Indeed, 
there would be few signatories if it did not. However, the Convention requires 
that any measures to protect national security be in response to the circumstances 
of the individual and the local conditions. 133 If each of the 208 refugee status 
claimants who were detained under the Operational Instruction had been 
individually assessed, some of them may well have justified detention in the 
climate of the time. But to detain them on the basis of such an arbitrary policy of 
prima facie detention deserves to be denounced. 
Furthermore, the plight of the genuine refugee should not be diminished by 
over-emphasising the larger problem of terrorism or economic migrants. 134 The 
effects of this world wide problem are neatly summed up by the Hon Lucienne 
Robillard, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Canada, who said 
The image of the refugee is gradually being superseded in the minds of many by the 
picture of the irregular migrant illegally gaining access to Canada, irrespective of the 
need for protection. There is a risk that the refugee-determination system may come to 
be seen as the vehicle for those who would abuse our generosity. This mistrust 
130 Tim Barnett, MP (15 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17376. 
131 Matt Robson, MP (15 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17354 
132 See Part III A 4 "An appropriate balance?" 
133 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of A!iylum 
Seekers (February 1999), Guideline 4. 
134 Attorney General v E [2000] 3 NZLR 257 para 62, per Thomas J (dissent) (CA) . 
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undermines the credibility of the system and, ultimately, affects societal attitudes to 
newcomers and the ability of those newcomers to integrate at the community level. 135 
It is important that we look at refugee status claims carefully and do not disregard 
the rights they are entitled to on the basis that others seek to abuse them. 
V IMMIGRATION AMENDMENT ACT 2002 
Like the Refugee Council case just discussed, the Immigration Amendment 
Act 2002 also changes the way that refugees can be dealt with under section 128. 
A History of the Act 
The Immigration Amendment Act 2002 was a response to the events on 
September 11. Originally contained in the Transnational Organised Crime Bill 
2002 ("the Bill"), it was part of a measure to amend various enactments to create 
offences in respect of, and otherwise discourage, transnational crime of certain 
descriptions. In particular, migrant smuggling and human trafficking were 
targeted. The Bill also sought to implement obligations in the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocols on the 
Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking of Persons, which New Zealand signed in 
December 2000. 
This Bill was criticised for introducing a number of provisions not directly 
related to migrant smuggling and for using "hysteria about foreigner dangers to 
slide through unnecessary threats to New Zealander's freedoms and the rule of 
135 The Hon Lucienne Robillard, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Canada, as cited by Hon Justice 
Baragwanath "Judicial Review and Administrative Law Issues Arising in Refugee Law Cases in New 
Zealand" (Conference oflntemational Association of Refugee Law Judges, Auckland, 10 March 2000) I 
<http://www. I awcom . govt. nz/ content/ speeches/j ud%2 Orev%rola w%20cases%20wdb-4apr. htm> (last 
accessed 31 March 2002). 
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law ."136 It was alleged that many unnecessary, or overly stringent measures 
would thereby be introduced via the back door. 
To meet these criticisms, the Bill was divided into five separate Acts at its 
third reading, one of which was the Immigration Amendment Bill 2002. This was 
assented to on 17 June 2002, and came into force the next day. Sections 9 and 10 
of the Amendment Act, modified the position of section 128 of the Immigration 
Act and the detention of refugees. 
B Sections 9 and 10 
While there is no purpose section in the Immigration Amendment Act, it is 
clear from the content of sections 9 and 10, and also from the comments of the 
Hon Phil Goff during Question Time, that these sections were included to address 
the "unduly restrictive" approach to bail under section 128. 137 
Sections 9 and 10 of the Act are aimed at providing a middle ground between 
detention under section 128 of the Immigration Act, and release into the 
community with a permit. They promote the rights of refugee status claimants 
according to the Refugee Convention and the Bill of Rights, while still allowing 
New Zealand to manage the risks associated with persons claiming refugee status 
at the border, and recogmse that some people currently detained could enjoy 
greater freedom. 138 
Section 9 concerns the detention and departure of persons refused permits. It 
repeals section 128(15), which denied bail to a person detained under section 128, 
136 Stephen Franks, MP "Sinister Add-ons to Terrorism, Boat People Bill" (I March 2002) Press Release. 
137 In particular under the old section 128 bail was only available to those who applied for judicial review 
of their detention under section 128A. Hon Phil Goff MP Questions to Ministers Transnational Organised 
Crime Bill - Asylum Seekers Question no 11(11 June 2002) NZPD <http://rangi .knowledge-
basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2002/06/l 1 012.htm>(last accessed 9 July 2002) 
138 Transnational Organised Crime Bill 2002, no 201 -1 (Commentary) 13 ; Hon Phil Goff, MP, (30 May 
2002) NZPD <http://rangi .knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2002/05/30> (last accessed 9 July 
2002). 
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and substitutes a new subsection 15, which continues to deny bail, but enables a 
person detained under that section to be released under section 128A, or the new 
section 128 AA. 
This means that a person detained under section 128 no longer has to apply for 
judicial review under section 128A, for which there is no legal aid available in 
order to be released. 
Section 10 sets out the new sections 128 AA - 128 AD. 
Section 128 AA applies to a person detained in custody under section 128(5) 
or under a section 128(7) warrant of commitment. An immigration officer may 
apply to a District Court Judge for an order of conditional release of any such 
person. 139 In addition, if the person is a refugee status claimant, they may apply 
themselves for conditional release. 140 
However, if the Judge declines to make such an order for release then, 
provided the person is not already subject to an order under section 128(7), a 
warrant of commitment must be issued authorising the person ' s detention for a 
period of not more than 28 days. 141 
Section 128AA also applies to people who are subject to an application under 
s128(13)(a) for the extension of a warrant of commitment,142 and in such a case an 
immigration officer, or the person concerned, may apply to a District Court Judge 
for an order of conditional release from custody under section 128AA(4). 
139 Immigration Act 1987, sl28AA(3) for people not claiming refugee status, and sl 28AA(4) for refugee 
claimants. 
140 Immigration Act 1987, sl28AA(4). This was inserted in Committee on 11 June 2002 by the amendment 
of Keith Locke MP It is a considerable advantage as it means that refugee claimants do not have to wait 28 
days to apply for release. 
141 Immigration Act 1987, sl28AA(8)(a). 
142 Immigration Act 1987, sl28AA(2)(b). 
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If the Judge declines to order conditional release, he or she may extend the 
warrant of commitment for not more than 7 days. 143 However, if the person is part 
of a mass arrival, all of whom are applying for conditional release, the Judge may 
extend or further extend the warrant of commitment for such period as the Judge 
thinks necessary in the circumstances, to aHow aJJ the persons in the group 
concerned to be properly dealt with. 144 
The new section 128AB sets out the conditions of an order of conditional 
release under section 128AA(6). This includes that special condition that refugee 
status claimants must attend any interview by a refugee status officer or the 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority under Part VIA. The Judge is free to impose 
any circumstances, in addition to the residence and reporting times stated in the 
section, as he or she sees fit. 
Section 128AC(7) states that any person released under section 128AA is to 
continue to be treated as detained under section 128, and nothing in Part II 
(relating to persons in New Zealand unlawfully and allowing appeal against the 
requirement to leave) applies to such a person. 
C Concerns for Refugees 
According to the Explanatory Note to the Transnational Organised Crime Bill, 
the obligations of state parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention are not altered by 
the Migrants Protocol , which the Bill aimed to implement. 145 Nor did the Bill 
itself alter these obligations. 146 Thus, our international obligations regarding 
refugees have not changed despite increasing security concerns. Whether the new 
provisions meet those obligations is a moot point, and probably ultimately 
depends on the interpretation of the Courts. 
143 Immigration Act 1987, sl28AA(8)(b)(ii). 
144 Immigration Act 1987, s128AA(8)(b)(i). 
w Transnational Organised Crime Bill 2002, no 201-1 (explanatory note) 3. 
Baragwanath J thought that 
Clause 25 of the [Transnat,onal Organised Crime) Bill [inserting new sections 128AA -
128AD) includes an amendment to the Immigration Act. It will , if enacted, provide 
additional flexibility in dealing appropriately with persons claiming refugee status at the 
border upon arrival , in light of their personal circumstances and identity, security, 
repatriation and other concems.147 
It is to be hoped that, in considering whether to grant conditional release, 
District Court Judges will consider the factors highlighted by Baragwanath J, but 
there is nothing in the Immigration Act 2002 to ensure that they do so. In their 
select committee submission, the Refugee Council recommended that if clause 25 
was to remain, section 128AA(6) should stipulate criteria to be considered. They 
submitted that this was necessary for certainty, as required by the rule of law, the 
Refugee Convention and the Bill of Rights. 148 
However, in their report to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 
on the Transnational Organised Crime Bill the Department of Labour rejected this 
suggestion. They considered it inappropriate, saying that release requires the 
balancing of many factors, which differ according to the circumstances of the 
case.149 
Even so, I think that there should be a requirement that Judges consider the 
individual circumstances of the case and have regard to the Refugee Convention 
in doing so. 150 
146 Hon George Hawkins, MP (28 February 2002) NZPD <http :l/rangi .knowledge-
basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2002/02/28> (last accessed 9 July 2002). 
147 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & the Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v AG (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland M1881-AS01 , para 75. 
148 Refugee Council of New Zealand "Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on 
the Transnational Organised Crime Bill 2002" para 49. 
149 Department of Labour " Departmental Report on Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee on the Transnational Organised Crime Bill 2002" 8. 
150 This should not be too problematic. See for example, Bail Act 2000 s8, which lists the criteria that 
judges must take into account in every bail application. And surely bail is no different from conditional 
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For example, as I noted previously, if a District Court Judge declines 
conditional release of mass ar1ivals, they may extend the warrant of commitment 
for such period as he or she considers necessary to deal with the whole group. 
This means that individual circumstances may not be considered, only the fact 
that the refugee claimant is part of a mass arrival. 
Although no comment was made on the mass arrival provisions in the select 
committee submissions for the Transnational Organised Crime Bill, there were 
some at the time of the Immigration Amendment Act 1999, which contains 
similar provisions in section 128(13B). 151 
In their report regarding the Immigration Amendment Act 1999, the New 
Zealand Immigration Service argued that the provisions for mass arrivals were 
necessary because of the desirability of speedy assessment of refugee claims and 
the potential concerns about public health and security issues. They considered 
that these would be facilitated by detaining the group as a whole, rather than just 
selected individuals. 152 The risk of a group wanting to abscond if their claim was 
refused was seen to be "potentially quite high" , justifying detention.153 
But even accepting these concerns, individual circumstances should still be 
considered. If the nature of the particular mass arrival is such that the health and 
security concerns do in fact warrant detention of the whole group together this 
would outweigh other individual needs. It is at least plausible that some mass 
arrivals will not present these concerns, and so do not all need to be detained. 
release applications in requiring differing factors to be balanced and the circumstances of the case to be 
considered? 
151 Section 128(13B)(b) allows a District Court Judge to further extend warrants of commitment 
concerning mass arrivals for such longer period as the Judge thinks necessary to allow all the people in the 
group to be properly dealt with. 
152 New Zealand Immigration Service "Briefing for Members on the Immigration Amendment Bill 1998" 
(2 November 1998) 4-5 . 
153 New Zealand Immigration Service "Immigration Amendment Bill 1998 Departmental Report to the 
Social Services Committtee" 23 . 
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In their submissions concerning the Immigration Amendment Act 1999, the 
Human Rights Commission ai,d the UNHCR both stated that detention of asylum 
seekers is inherently undesirable and where resorted to, should be clearly 
prescribed by law. It should be a last resort and should be used only for the 
minimum period possible. They were concerned that there were no specified 
limits on the duration of detention of mass arrivals, 154 and the lack of specific 
provisions ensuring expeditious but fair processing. 155 
The NZIS considered that detention under section 128 is prescribed by law as 
it can be extended if the Judge 
is of the view that continued detention is, in the circumstances, justified. There is no 
requirement for a Judge to extend the warrant merely because an extension is sought. 
The fact that a case had not been processed expeditiously would clearly constitute 
grounds for a Judge to consider that detention of an asylum seeker pending determination 
of his or her claim might no longer be justified. Any detention resulting from a warrant 
issued pursuant to s 128 is clearly prescribed by law.
156 
However, the evidence accepted by Baragwanath J in the Refugee Council Case 
about the almost invariable practice by District Court Judges of extending 
warrants when asked to, throws these statements into question. 157 
Rather than conditional release on what amounts to bail , (even if not so 
called), the UNHCR favours a presumption against detention in the first place. 
The degree to which asylum-seekers can effectively challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention, however, varies significantly. In many States, asylum-seekers are expected to 
initiate the review process themselves, by applying for bail or parole, which often poses 
difficulties given their unfamiliarity with the legal process and, in many cases, their 
154 Human Rights Commission "Submission to the Social Services Committee on the Immigration 
Amendment Bill 1998" (16 November 1998) para 2.3 .4. 
155 UNHCR " Submission to the Social Services Committee on the Immigration Amendment Bill 1998" (16 
November 1998) para 8. 
156 New Zealand Immigration Service "Immigration Amendment Bill 1998- Departmental Report to the 
Social Services Committee" 23 . 
157 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & The Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v Attorney General (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland Ml881 - ASOl , para 101 -
102. 
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inability to speak the language. These difficulties are even more acute when assistance in 
the form of legal aid is not available. In order to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers 
are respected in this regard, there should be prompt, mandatory and periodic review of all 
detention orders before an independent and impartial body. 
UNHCR shares the opinion of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that in States 
where such challenges are by way of bail hearings "asylum seekers may have no effective 
opportunity to challenge the reasons for the detention, as the focus would be on 
establishing the reliability of the surety and its relationship to the applicant as opposed to 
the reasons for the detention .
158 
In New Zealand a key problem remams that legal aid is not available to 
challenge detention. While section 128AA provides conditional release, it does 
not go to the legality of the original detention. However, to provide legal aid at 
this stage would involve a reversal of the policy decisions of 1999, which 
extended legal aid in relation to refugee status claims, but, in response to 
perceived abuse of the system, removed it for other immigration matters not 
involving residents. 159 Nevertheless, Hon Lianne Dalziel, Minister of 
Immigration, said that while the Immigration Amendment Act was not directed 
towards legal aid, she could commit Parliament to looking into funding legal 
representation for refugee status clamaints regarding detention, although not 
necessarily through the grant of legal aid. 16
0 
As a final point, it is interesting to note that even if conditionally released 
under section 128AA, people are still officially detained according to section 
128AC(7). The reason behind this is probably the fact that if a person is 
ultimately deported due to their unlawful presence in New Zealand, the airline 
that brought them here must pay the cost of deportation, so Jong as the person has 
158 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner' s Programme Standing Committee Detention of 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended Praclice ( 4 June 1999) 
para 16 - 17. 
159 Department of Labour " Departmental Report on Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee on the Transnational Organised Crime Bill 2002" 8. 
160 Hon Lianne Dalziel , MP (11 June 2002) NZPD<http://rangi .knowledge-
basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/200206/ l l 071.html> (last accessed 9 July 2002). 
been detained during the interim period. 161 There was much discussion in the 
Select Committee submissions on the Transnational Organised Crime Bill 
concerning the extension of carrier liability, which I do not wish to enter. Suffice 
to say, I think that this is a poor reason for prima facie detention of refugee status 
claimants, as it puts dollars before human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
VI THE RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN THE IMMIGRATION AMENDMENT 
ACT AND THE REFUGEE COUNCIL CASE 
One of the main concerns expressed at select committee about the proposed 
legislation was that it was seen as justifying the use of section 128 to detain 
refugees, which was at the time being challenged in the High Court in the case of 
Refugee Council Case. Furthermore, that as originally drafted, section 128AA 
allegedly extended the power of detention under section 128 to include refugee 
claimants by back door tactics - at that time only mentioning refugee status 
claimants in a minor provision: section 128AB(l)(b).
162 However, this was 
changed, and now section 128AA(2) makes it clear that refugees are subject to 
these provisions. 
While it is inherently undesirable for the outcome of litigation to be pre-
empted in such a way, the problem is not so great in this case as Baragwanath J 
decided that section 128 applies to refugee status claimants anyway. He also 
invited legislative response to deal with conditional release of refugees, stating 
that Parliament is normaBy regarded as "the decision maker which can deal with 
the issue most effectively and authoritatively" .
1
6.3 
161 Immigration Act 1987, s125(4). 
162 Refugee Council of New Zealand "Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on 
the Transnational Organised Crime Bill" para 22. 
163 Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc & The Human Rights Foundation of Aolearoa New Zealand 
Incorporated and D v Attorney General (31 May 2002) High Court Auckland M1881 - AS01, para 25 . 
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In any case, it is clear that section 128 does apply to refugee claimants. What 
can be questioned, is how the new legislation and the Refugee Council Case will 
interact, if at all. 
Will section 128 still be read as Baragwanath J decided it should be, with 
refugees only being detained where necessary? This would mean that section 
128AA would only come into play in those same limited circumstances. 
This seems an unlikely outcome because if only those that pose a threat are 
detained, then section 128AA becomes redundant, as these people will 
presumably be ineligible for conditional release for the very reason that their 
detention was necessary. 
The more likely outcome is that the effect of the Refugee Council case will be 
limited to cases under the pre-2002 amendment legislation. In which case, all 
future refugees status claimants arriving without a permit will be detained 
pursuant to section 128(5), but will then be able to apply for conditional release 
under section 128AA. In that situation, there would still be prima facie detention, 
which is inconsistent with the Article 31.2 of the Refugee Convention as 
discussed earlier. 
In practice, this whole argument may be academic. A recent newspaper report 
suggests that that most new arrivals are still being held in detention, contravening 
both Baragwanath J's decision and the new Act.
164 
This is the outcome feared by Keith Locke MP m his speech at the 
Transnational Organised Crime Bill's second reading: 
The changes we are making include a system of conditional release for imprisoned 
asylum seekers that on the one hand might seem a step forward , but on the other hand 
could be part of a process of legitimising the routine imprisonment of asylum seekers, 
164 "Policy puts off asylum seekers" (16 August 2002) The Dominion Post Wellington A7 . 
whereby virtually all asylum seekers who arrive in this country are put in prison, often for 
long periods of several months, which is a huge injustice for people who have suffered so 
much overseas before they get here.
165 
Rather than detaining everyone and then releasing only those that the NZIS 
consider safe, it would be preferable, from a human rights point of view, to only 
detain those who are a threat in the first place. The prima facie detention under 
section 128(5) does not require justification or reasonable cause. The only 
criterion for detention is that they are a spontaneous refugee, in which case they 
can expect to be refused a permit on arrival in New Zealand. This arguably 
breaches not only the Refugee Convention, but also sections 21 and 22 of the Bill 
of Rights Act 1990. 166 
Baragwanath J only allowed detention where necessary. The Immigration 
Amendment Act on the other hand, allows detention for everyone who arrives in 
New Zealand unlawfully , but with the conditional release of all except those 
which it is necessary to detain. While there might not seem much difference 
between the outcome of the two approaches - both basically require a presumption 
against detention, the differences could be very important in the future. If 
detention is retained as the first step for all refugee claimants it is much easier to 
justify a change in policy such as the one seen after September 11 of not releasing 
anyone on bail. If the position was that only those necessary to detain were 
detained from the outset it would be much harder to shift policy to detain 
everyone. Under this analysis, bail could be seen as mere "sugar coating" of a 
policy of detention. 167 
165 Keith Locke MP Second Reading Transnational Organised Crime Bill (30 May 2002) NZPD 
<http:l/rangi .knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2002/05/03> Oast accessed 9 July 2002). 
166 Refugee Council of New Zealand "Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on 
the Transnational Organised Crime Bill" para 24. 
167 Keithe Locke MP Questions to Ministers Transnational Organised Crime Bill - Asylum Seekers, 
Question No 11 (11 June 2002) NZPD <http ://rangi knowledge-
basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2002/06/ l l 012.html> (last accessed 9 July 2002). 
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However, considering that these measures were part of a transnational security 
drive, it is unsurprising that the emphasis is in favour of security. This means that 
someone is more likely to be detained when it was not necessary (and their rights 
breached) than someone released who should not be (and national security 
threatened). This can, perhaps, be justified as protecting the collective right of all 
New Zealanders to liberty and freedom from harm, over the right of individuals to 
liberty. 
Even if this position is acceptable, another concern is that wrongly detained 
refugee status claimants are even further sacrificed as they do not get the benefit 
of the complaints system under the Human Rights Act 1993.
168 This seems to cut 
across the purpose of the Human Rights Act to "provide better protection of 
human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with United Nations 
Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights". 
169 
But, despite all these concerns, it has to be accepted that the enactment of 
sections 128AA to 128 AD is an improvement on the previous situation, so long 
as they are properly used.
170 They at least provide an alternative to detention or 
release into the community with a permit. Prior to the Immigration Act 2002, 
where NZIS had not issued a permit, detainees could only be released by habeas 
corpus or judicial review proceedings in the High Court, for which legal aid is not 
available. 
168 Sees 149D Immigration Act 1987, as amended by the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 s 55
. 
These exemptions are much narrower than previously existed under the Human Rights Act sl 53
(3) and the 
previous Immigration Acts 149D which basically banned any application of the former to the la
tter. At 
least now the Human Rights Commission will be able to inquire into matters and make public st
atements 
and so on. However, the exemptions still prevent refugees from making a complaint under the H
uman 
Rights Act, which is the most valuable part. 
169 Human Rights Act 1993, Jong title. 
170 See "Policy puts off asylum seekers" (16 August 2002) The Dominion Post Wellington A7, whic
h 
suggests that new arrivals are still being detained without conditional release. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
The right to control borders is an important aspect of State sovereignty, and is 
jealously guarded. 171 Controlling borders requires decisions to be made about 
who you let in, and how you will stop those that you don't want to enter from 
doing so. Detention is an effective way of preventing unwanted entry. 
Conversely, liberty is a fundamental human right, which needs to be balanced 
against this right of the State. Where people try to enter a State unlawfully 
limitations on the right to freedom may well be justified. However, in the case of 
refugees greater justification is required. New Zealand voluntarily acceded to the 
1951 Refugee Convention, and has recently reaffirmed its commitment. It must 
then respect the consequences of such undertakings. 
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention provides that refugee status claimants 
should not be detained, other than in strictly circumscribed instances of necessity. 
While not directly incorporated into New Zealand domestic law, the Convention 
is still important and must be regarded. 
Section 128 of the Immigration Act and the way it was interpreted m 
governmental policy prior to the Refagee Council case did not give effect to 
Article 31. It could have been argued that this expressly overrode it. This would 
mean that while other parts of the Convention had been specifically imported into 
New Zealand law, Article 31 had no relevance. 
However, recent developments have shown that his is not the case. Clearly 
Article 31 has a bearing on New Zealand domestic law. In the Refagee Council 
case, Baragwanath J considered that although refugees may be detained under 
section 128, this was only to be where necessary. The Immigration Amendment 
171 Atle Grahl Madsen Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Division of International Protection 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1997) 168. 
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Act 2002 also requires that conditional release from detention only be denied 
where necessary. 
While these developments, to change this awkward application of section 128 
to refugee status claimants, are to be commended for bringing New Zealand 
closer to her international obligations under Article 31 , there is still room for 
improvement. But so long as refugees and other illegal migrants are not 
distinguished in the legislation , the problems will continue. 
Panic reactions to perceived security threats do not help the situation. While 
undeniably terrorists, criminals and economic migrants exist and may try to enter 
New Zealand by improper means, this should not be used to undermine the rights 
of refugees entirely. Most refugees are not criminals, nor suspected of being so. 
We should not punish refugees in order to appear to be taking action about other 
less worthy candidates. 
Nevertheless, despite these growing fears about boat people and terrorists, 
New Zealand is getting closer to finding the appropriate balance between the right 
of refugees not to be detained, as set out in Article 31.2 of the Convention, and 
the right of the State to control its borders. 
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